From the "socialist", ideological, ethnically neutral and multinational state to the extreme nation state

For the purpose of this paper, two features of the upheavals in the realm of former "really existing socialism" are of great importance.

1. The "socialist" state, which in many respects favoured the "working class" but in legal terms did not prescribe or condone discrimination on any ground but political opinion, was generally replaced by an outwardly liberal democratic state, which in most instances is heavily loaded in favour of the dominant ethnic group. To be more precise, most post-communist states in East and Central Europe are based on strict adherence to the ethno-nationalist concept of the "nation state" as a state primarily "belonging" to the dominant, most numerous, "historic", "constituent", "state building" etc. nation. Members of other ethnic groups are in most cases formally recognized, declared equal and protected, but essentially treated as an anomaly, or as tolerated historic "guests" . Even in situations when the latter do not fear loss of citizenship (nationality) or discrimination, the general political "message", explicitly or implicitly reflected in the constitution and various laws, is that they cannot claim to influence the vital affairs of the state, it being the end of historical aspirations of one (ethnic) nation and the most important means for the protection of its fundamental interests, such as survival, independence, culture etc.

As a result of this, nationality as a link between an individual and his/her ethnic group (nation) has been either confused with nationality as a link between a citizen and his/her state (German Staatsangehörigkeit), or the first has taken precedence over the latter, even in legal terms. This mother-child relationship has been cultivated and manifested in dubious law, such as the insistence, in Latvia and Estonia, that the ethnically different former citizens of the USSR who are denied citizenship of those re-constituted states would not become stateless, because they belong to their nation state, indicated by their ethnicity (Plotnieks), or by the provisions of many post-communist constitutions stressing the duty of the state to assist ethnic co-nationals abroad, although they are foreign nationals (citizens). Apart from being highly questionable under international law (Gomien 1991, p. 3), such provisions cannot but add to the isolation and estrangements of national minorities in the countries where they live: they gradually become more "alien" and their leaders start corresponding to the nationalist-extremist cliche of "traitors" and "foreign agents".

2. Whereas in those countries that under "socialism" still maintained a national image and were named after the dominant nation this process essentially strengthened or exaggerated the ethnic features of the state, it was disastrous for multinational federations, which, at least constitutionally, did not recognize the supremacy of one nation. Of the three "socialist" federations, two, Yugoslavia and the USSR, collapsed almost immediately, and the third, Czecho-Slovakia, could not survive even in a reconstructed, liberal version. It seems that post-communist nationalism cannot tolerate the idea of a multinational state, let alone a state that is "anational". This invites interesting comparisons with post-fascist states, which retained their multi-ethnicity (Spain), and reverted to federalism (Germany) and decentralization (Italy). The USSR was not ethnically identifiable by name, which implied that the socio-political order (the power of the soviets) was the backbone of the union and its principal cohesive force. The name of Yugoslavia only indicated that the principal ethnic groups in the country belonged to the south Slavonic group of nations, each of them linked in name to a federal unit, except in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina . Only in Czecho-Slovakia, which was an unusual two-member federation, the name of the state reflected its ethnic composition.

All three states (Yugoslavia and Czecho-Slovakia initially not as federations) were created approximately at the same time, after World War I. They existed for more than seventy years and resulted in numerous social and personal links. Irrespective of ethnic differences, a great majority of the population, at least those belonging to ethnic groups who had "their" federal units - "titular nationalities" in the words of Tishkov (1992, p. 42), were not treated as minorities and did not feel as such, irrespective of their place of residence. This led to further movements and displacements, contributing to the ethnic mix. With the breakdown of the federations, and their replacement by a multitude of typically post-communist nation states, a large number of new minorities emerged, composed of people totally unaccustomed to minority status, surrounded by their hitherto co-national neighbours, who have overnight become superior in the sense of the ethno-nationalist constitutions described above.

The significance of borders between federal units is considerably lesser than that of international boundaries. If they do not correspond to ethnic divides, this does not raise important difficulties. Common nationality (citizenship) of the federation accounts for considerable horizontal mobility, which again relativizes the significance of inter-unit lines and increases the numbers of persons of other ethnicity. When, after the dissolution of the federation, these feeble demarkation lines had to be replaced by international boundaries, this was a shock, the effects of which were greatly aggravated by nationalist insistence on clean ethnic frontiers. Depending on the perceptions of the ethno-national interests of the new nationalist leaders the pre-existing internal borders were upheld by the one side and revised by the other. This was compounded by different interpretations of the right to self-determination, which was, in accordance with political expediency, differently interpreted as belonging to the "people" in the sense of the inhabitants of the former federal unit, or "people" as an ethnic nation . Under such circumstances, peaceful dissolution is highly improbable and tends to result in wars for territory. These wars will probably have to be settled by peace treaties, as matters in former Yugoslavia seem to indicate. For the purpose of this paper it is important to note that persons belonging to the ethnic groups in other parts of the former federal state come, during and after the wars, to be regarded as hostile and potentially subversive, which again contributes to the unwillingness to grant minority rights to them, and, by association, to any other minority.

Communist totalitarianism as foreign domination: the historical guilt of ethnic aliens

This story is compounded by the curious fact that, in most former "communist" countries, the story of "communist" totalitarianism and authoritarianism is being rethought and rewritten along nationalist lines. This means that the Leninist, Stalinist and post-Stalinist "real socialist" rule has increasingly been reinterpreted as foreign domination and oppression. In East and Central Europe the invaders allegedly came from the USSR (and the local communists were only foreign agents), in the Soviet Union, the oppressors were the Russians, and the Russians in turn have to look for reasons of their calamity to the non-Russian bolsheviks, most of them Jews. In countries where the communist rule was imposed by autochthonous communist parties, with less conspicuous Soviet help, it is always the ethnic "others" who are responsible. A good example is Yugoslavia, where most ethnic groups blame the Serbs, and the Serbs in turn blame the Croats, the Slovenes and the Albanians (Dimitrijevic 1991).

The general result is that, unlike the time of "acute dissidence" the era of "really existing socialism" is not regarded as a time of denial of individual rights, but as a time of national frustration and violation of collective ethnic rights. Members of the responsible "dominant" nations, who "profited" under communism and were identified with some kind of imperialism are now regarded as bearers of collective guilt, which they feel very poignantly if they suddenly become a minority in the new state in which they live. Thus Russians in the Baltic states have to repent for the forcible annexation to the Soviet Union carried out mostly by Russian troops, Serbs in Croatia for their allegedly dominant position in the communist army and the police, Croats in Serbia for the crimes of the Croatian puppet government in World War II, allegedly covered up by Tito, who was a Croat, Armenians in Azerbaijan for formerly siding with the Russians, Azeris in Armenia for the exact opposite etc.

The insecurity and frustration of old and new minorities

As a result of this, the following groups with a separate identity find themselves in an unusual minority position, for which they have not been prepared and which results in their subjective and objective inferiority, which has to be considered if political difficulties and human suffering is to be avoided.

1. The experience of multinational states and "anational" federations, together with the communist experiment of substituting class and ideological allegiance for national ties has weakened the national consciousness in a number of individuals. Now, a person that refuses to be ethnically identified (an ethnic "atheist") is inconceivable for the nationalists. Aggregations of such individuals can be numerically important. Not only are such people to be found in countries of immigration outside Europe, but they have emerged in multinational states in Europe. In Yugoslavia it was possible to state "Yugoslav" as national belonging, and in 1981 about 6% of the population, or 1 219 045 persons, declared themselves to be "Yugoslavs". They have no place in the new nationalist setup and are treated with utmost suspicion. It is interesting that the Constitution of Croatia expressly recognizes a number of very small ethnic groups, but does not mention the Yugoslavs, although in the census conducted in Croatia after the proclamation of that act the Yugoslav group proved to be the second non-Croat group in numerical strength: Yugoslavs comprised 2.2% of the population, double as much as the Muslims listed second (after the Serbs) in the Constitution . According to the Croatian electoral laws, all candidates have to indicate their (ethno)nationality after their name: at the July 1992 elections, Yugoslavs were recognizable by the indication that they were "undecided . "Undecided" people cannot organize, they have no common origin or separate language or other features related to ethnicity and thus cannot claim minority status .

There was much ado about the "Soviet man" in the USSR, but such people were not registered at censuses. There are, however, indications that many members of the "Russian speaking" minorities in non-Slavic states in the territory of the former Soviet Union (Central Asia, the Baltic republics) feel vaguely "Soviet", the way they had felt to be "Rossiiski", and not Russian, in the Russian Empire ("Rossia"). Many of them are not Russian, but Byelorussian, Ukrainian etc . They have been generally described by the language they speak, and Russian used to be the lingua franca of the Soviet Union. As exemplified by the nationality (citizenship) debate in Estonia and Latvia, they do not seem to be accepted as a minority (a non-national is not a member of a minority in a given state), but are offered either statelessness or the nationality of Russia. In the latter case they would become aliens linked to a country that might not be closest to them in the ethnic sense.

2. Close to those who identified only with the wider framework of the federal state are persons who, after the dissolution of a state, find themselves reduced from members of a recognized constituent nation to persons belonging to a national minority. Especially dramatic are the psychological and political effects of this change when it affects those who used to identify themselves with the most numerous and (at least culturally) dominant nations. The best examples seem to be the Russians and the Serbs. In the Soviet Union, the former used to feel at ease in the whole territory, where their language was official and readily spoken. Their "comfortable" position seems to have been taken for granted (and was perceived by other as arrogance), so that no federal unit was exclusively "Russian" and, what was probably politically most important, there was no Russian section of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Millions of Russians find themselves now outside Russia, where they have been treated either as a national minority or as aliens, in most cases as unwelcome reminders of communism they allegedly imposed. This impression was certainly strengthened by the haughty attitude of some of them, who persisted in considering themselves as an elite, refusing to bend to local customs, to respect local traditions, to learn the local language etc.

The Serbs in Yugoslavia have been scattered through the territory of that state. In the republic named Serbia they comprised about two thirds of the population, but they lived in considerable numbers in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Montenegro. Only Montenegro remained within the reduced state of Yugoslavia, whereas in other former republics - now considered by the United Nations and by a majority of states to be independent and sovereign states , they started to be treated as a national minority (Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia) or believed to be dominated by non-Serbs (Bosnia-Herzegovina). In those new states, where Serbs form a considerable part of the population (Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina), reduction to a national minority was experienced as humiliating degradation, especially if it was accompanied by triumphant nationalism of the government. This was one of the causes of the tragic events in former Yugoslavia.

3. A common feature of all exclusive nationalisms has been to deny the existence of "uncomfortable" ethnic groups or nations, such as e.g. the religiously "estranged" Azaris in Georgia and Muslims in Yugoslavia. The existence of Macedonians has been rejected by Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian nationalists. In Bulgaria, the change of policy under the communist regime resulted in a "statistical genocide" of the Macedonians: the population of 187,789 Macedonians in the 1956 census was reduced to 9,632 in the 1965 census. The same fate befell the Pomaks, whom some consider to be islamicized Macedonians and the Bulgarian authorities to be Bulgarians tout court (Liebich 1992, p. 34). Many Ukrainians, including some former dissidents and human rights activists, energetically deny the existence of Ruthenians, and suggest that matters pertaining to their identity be submitted to an arbitration of historians and ethnologists . It is not great news then to learn that some Tatars reject separate Bashkir identity (Sheehy 1992, p. 34). Nationalists vie for seniority and have ancient claims: they seem to believe that there have been historical deadlines for the creation of nations, after which no applicants can be considered. Is it to be believed that in the future no new ethnic groups will emerge, or at least groups with a new identity?

Complaints about "artificial nations" are a favourite part of the nationalists' rhetoric. To be sure, their argument carries some weight in former communist countries, for the invention and fragmentation of ethnic groups was a method of governance through the "Marxist solution of the national question". The most striking example was the Soviet attempt to create a Moldovan, separate from Romanian, nation, supported by the imposition of the Cyrillic alphabet (Liebich 1992, p. 34).

On the other hand, it is easily forgotten that internationalist communists were, at least initially, liberal in their attitudes toward small and oppressed ethnic groups, and that they gave some of them the first historical chance to establish their claims to separate identity (Tishkov 1992, p. 46; Magen 1992). In Yugoslavia, this was certainly the case with Macedonians and ethnic Muslims. To simple minds, individuals who genuinely believe to belong to newly recognized ethnic groups are not only "national traitors", but illegitimate children of communism, as well. In non-communist Greece, the common wisdom is that the Macedonian nation was "created" by Tito, above all to harm the Greeks.

3. One of the common features of all post-communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe is their failure to upgrade ethnic groups that had no standing under the communist system, although they have undoubtedly existed. In a society permeated by nationalism and national concerns, this appears more important than in the nationally subdued communist system. Characteristic is the stubborn refusal to recognize Gypsies as a national minority or even a respectable ethnic group. This goes hand in hand with extreme anti-Gypsy feelings. All reliable data from Central and Eastern Europe indicate that Gypsies occupy the highest spot as targets of hate, suspicion and social distance (Barany 1992, p. 44). In a survey conducted in 1991, Gypsies were rejected as neighbours by 72% of the interviewees in Poland, 76% in Hungary and 85% in Czecho-Slovakia. Another survey showed that the dislike of the Romani people amounted to 71% in Bulgaria (Barany 1992, p. 45). This is accompanied by persistent attempts to reduce the statistical importance of the Gypsy community .

4. Finally, under the "Marxist solution" some minorities enjoyed, at least in some "socialist" states, such as e.g. the USSR (notably in the pre-Stalinist period) and Yugoslavia, nominal and formal rights and privileges that were above those in most other states. This specially applied to wide territorial autonomy of the areas principally inhabited by a minority, in the form of autonomous provinces and regions. Not only was the language of the minority the official language of the autonomous unit, but it was freely used throughout the territory of the whole state and in federal institutions. For instance, members of the Federal Parliament in former Yugoslavia could speak any minority language, whereas simultaneous interpretation was provided for two minority languages, Albanian and Hungarian. The Official Gazette was also published in these two languages. (Dimitrijevic 1992, p. 47). The majorities in new and reformed states find that this status should be cut to proportions that they consider normal. For instance, in Serbia, the official use of the minority languages has been reduced to areas "where nationalities (minorities) live, and in accordance with the law" (Art. 8 (2) of the Constitution). The Law on the Official Use of the Language and the Alphabet delegates, in turn, to municipalities the decision as to whether nationalities live in the territory of a municipality and which languages are to be used (Art. 11). One of the new limitations is that exclusively the Serbian version of the toponymies and personal names is to be used on public signs, the only concession to the minority being the possibility to use the spelling appropriate to its language and alphabet (Art. 7). Generally, educational facilities are made available depending on the marked presence of the minority in an area and the number of pupils or students.

Everyone will note that reference to constitutional and legal provisions which reduce the status of the minorities cannot reflect what they perceive to be the general deterioration of their position in the political and psychological sense. References to international standards are no consolation, especially when the change occurs in the realm of policies, based on the same general provisions. Thus, for instance, the Serbian Law on Radio and Television provides that "Radio-Television Novi Sad prepares and produces radio and television programme for the territory of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina in Serbo-Croat and the languages of nationalities" (Art. 20 (2)). The time allocated at Novi Sad stations to broadcasts in minority (nationality) languages has been reduced in February 1993 - for reasons of economy, according to the government appointed management. The representatives of the Association of Slovaks, Romanians and Ruthenians in Yugoslavia were of a different view. They believed that under the pretext that information in the languages of minorities is "above European and world standards", many programmes have been abolished - those in particular, which have mostly contributed to the preservation of the national identities and which have been the most popular. If, in time of general economic crisis, it is minority rights that suffer first, this cannot be called economy, but discrimination.

All minorities, old and new, have to live in a surrounding of boastful references to the superiority of the dominant nation, to its past glories and victories (not infrequently over the nations to which minorities belong), amidst a rhetoric of deprecation, derision and hate, exposed to projects of future restriction and exclusion of elements not belonging to the nation, and, what is most disturbing, to incitement to national and religious hatred that goes unpunished. Article 20(2) of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, which obligates its signatories to "prohibit by law" "any advocacy of national, racial and religious hatred" has been as a rule implemented by the successors to the former communist states parties very literally: such laws do exist but are not put in practice.

Situations of legal and factual status deterioration

On the basis of this factual sketch, the following situations can be identified.

1. After political and constitutional changes (following the dissolution of a state) a group that was at least tolerated finds itself without a recognized ethnic identity. Practically, there is no difference between those who did not find it necessary, under the previous regime, to claim a determined constitutional status, and those who lost their "acquired rights" under the former constitutional system, although for the latter the feeling of loss must be more pronounced. Under the previous system, not being treated as a minority could have been taken as an advantage; under the new arrangement, where collective national rights are paramount, not being a part of the "constituent people" or a recognized minority leaves a considerable group in limbo, which cannot be repaired through individual human rights, which, in the nationalist context, have lost their significance.

2. An ethnic identity is simply abolished.

3. A group that, under the previous regime, had a status above that of a minority (majority or "constituent nation") finds itself relegated to the position of a minority.

4. Still worse, members of the same group become aliens, thus losing the rights that according to municipal and international law belong only to citizens. If they acquire the nationality of another state, they at least enjoy its diplomatic protection. If they become stateless, they are extremely vulnerable.

4. A group continues to be recognized as a minority, but its rights under the previous constitutional system are reduced to what is now believed by the majority to be "fair", "reasonable", or to correspond to some minimum derived from international and comparative law.

5. A group, neglected, unrecognized and underprivileged under the old regime, remains so under the new one. With the increase of the importance of belonging to a nation or a recognized ethnic group, its position deteriorates de facto.

These situations are psychologically painful and politically explosive. Legally speaking, most of them raise the important and interesting question of acquired national and minority rights. The tendency seems to be to reduce the "exaggerated" rights and privileges given to some ethnic groups in the past (especially if this is considered a part of Marxist phantasies) and to offer the groups in question something vaguely described as minority rights "guaranteed under international law" or "granted by the international community". International law, as it is, does not offer strong reassurances to relevant groups, even if its individualistic approach to minority rights is taken as sufficient. Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights, is subject to auto-interpretation: a government can deny the existence of minorities on its territory. On the other hand, under the prevailing nationalist concept of the nation-state and its constitution, the promise that the position of every citizen would be secured through his or her individual rights does not appear to be very convincing.

Possible solutions: respect of acquired rights and personal choice

5.1. The multinational nation-state.- It appears to be in the interest of international peace, as well as in the interest of all states concerned - irrespective of their nature (continuity, revival, succession) - to try to lessen tensions which occur for reasons listed above and thus to try to win the loyalty of all their citizens. The best way to achieve this is to insist on the civic character of the state, where ethnic allegiance plays a subordinate role, where demos prevails over the ethnos. This does not seem to be possible under present conditions of nationalism. It should, however, be realized that in spite of everything, the prospect of an ethnically pure state is as unrealistic as the establishment or re-establishment of a "anational" state or a true multinational federation. The dominant ethnic group (nation) still must be concerned to reduce ethnic friction and to minimize the danger of open resistance and disloyalty. It can reassure minorities, old and new, by respecting their acquired rights under the previous regime, even if they appear above what is perceived to be the international standard. The only permissible exceptions should be aimed at reducing the advantages that would make persons belonging to a minority a privileged group.

5.2. Territorial or personal autonomy? - Experience seems to indicate that the protection of minority rights through territorial autonomy, similar to that in "socialist" autonomous regions and provinces, will meet with most resistance from the new nation states. This corresponds to the general feeling that territorial autonomies have been viewed from both sides as temporary, transitional arrangements: in the eyes of the majority nationalists, they have been supposed to lead to full incorporation, and in the eyes of their minority opposite numbers, they were but a prelude to full independence or reunion with the "mother" state . In the words of Yoram Dinstein, "autonomy has always been given reluctantly, and accepted without gratitude". Another problem, related to territorial autonomy and not in the field of beliefs and attitudes, is that it produces, in real life, minorities within minorities, the most explosive mix being the de facto minority position of persons otherwise belonging to the majority nation in the nation state. Furthermore, protection of the minority centered around territorial arrangements leaves out significant numbers of the minority population who reside outside the area where the minority is predominant, and especially those in large urban agglomerations.

It appears therefore both realistic and reasonable to substitute territorial autonomy by other arrangements, even at the cost of the feeling of loss of acquired rights. There have been suggestions to replace territorial by personal autonomy, although the concept remains unclear. If this autonomy would be modelled after the status of the Sami people in some Scandinavian countries, the question arises whether this would be applicable to situations where the difference in culture and lifestyles is not as pronounced as between the Samis and their majority environment.

5.3. The right of option.- It is true that in matters of succession it is the territory than changes its sovereign, so that persons living on it must follow suit. However, dramatic changes in one's status which occur without any participation of the person concerned, without any notice taken of his/her wish and will, leave a sense of frustration and do not augur well for the future. The same goes for one's belonging to a national minority. More recently the effect of peace treaties on the nationality of persons inhabiting areas that change their sovereign has been mitigated by the right of option, which offered the individuals concerned the opportunity to choose their nationality in full cognizance of the consequences of this choice (Kunz 1930, 1947). This seems to be easily applicable to situations where the nationality of the members of certain ethnic groups in question, and it might necessitate bilateral treaties between the territorial state and the "ethnic" state, provided the latter is willing to grant its nationality to persons connected with it by ethnic ties who refuse to take the nationality of the territorial state. This would help change the emphasis from those who cannot or are not allowed to take the new nationality to those who refuse it. Human beings would thus not be helpless flotsam in the sea of international and national politics, but persons influencing their destiny. This would also help discern among those who resist falling below the condition of others surrounding them, and those who insist on their acquired rights in order to enjoy a privileged position.

5.4. International standards adapted to local circumstances.-The principle underlying the right of option can be applied to minorities outside matters pertaining to nationality if it is taken in its essence as the maximum respect of the dignity, integrity and choice of a person. As already stated, vague promises of the enjoyment of some general international standards cannot reassure national minorities as long as those standards are not precisely defined and as long as matters relating to ethnicity are of paramount importance. The sense of loss and anxiety, related to the reduction of acquired rights, deemed natural for preceding generations, is not a healthy civic and political phenomenon, especially when countered by legalisms of nationalist jurists, which boil down to the argument that the previous more favourable conditions for the minorities "were not just" and "are not tolerated in any state" etc. Even when international standards become much clearer than they are now, the ideal position of minorities in any given society will amount to reasonable adaptation to requirements of social peace and the respect of good traditions. Respect for rights acquired under previous constitutional regimes can only contribute to satisfactory solutions if it is reconciled with the general principles of non-discrimination.

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