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'Policing and the Northern Ireland Peace Process' by Roger Mac Ginty

The following article has been contributed by Roger Mac Ginty, Research Development Officer with INCORE (INitiative on COnflict Resolution and Ethnicity). The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of the members of the CAIN Project. The CAIN Project would welcome other material which meets our guidelines for contributions.

The article is also available as a downloadable document which can saved and opened in 'Word'.

This article is copyright © 1997 Roger Mac Ginty and is included on the CAIN site by permission of the author. You may not edit, adapt, or redistribute changed versions of this for other than your personal use without the express written permission of the author. Redistribution for commercial purposes is not permitted.

Introduction
The Northern Ireland peace process has not reached a stage in which the main parties to the conflict have enaged in a constructive dialogue on possible post-conflict policy scenarios. It is reasonable to expect that a whole range of issues which had been over-shadowed by years of political violence might become the subject for legitimate debate once that violence ends. With certain exceptions, this has not happened. Most attempts to initiative policy debates, were swallowed by the immediacy of temporal politics or were only dealt with briefly before interest shifted to another issue. Importantly, many of Northern Ireland’s politicians and commentators refused to believe, in the absence of the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, that loyalist and republican paramilitary organisations had permanently committed themselves to non-violence. More fundamentally, there was no shared conception of what the ‘peace process’ entailed and what its end result might be. The tendency was for nationalists and unionists to interpret post-conflict scenarios according to their preferences. Many unionists were inclined to view the process suspiciously as an exclusively nationalist vehicle. The preferred unionist post-conflict scenario was a strengthening of the Union, and their preferred policy options reflected this. For nationalists, the preferred option was a dilution or breaking of the Union and so policy issues were often discussed in terms of an Irish dimension. The result was that the peace process, among Northern Ireland’s main political parties and the British and Irish governments, did not fuel sustained, dispassionate debates on credible policy options for a post-politically violent Northern Ireland. Policing is one issue which it would be reasonable to expect to be addressed in a political process attempting to agree on the future of a divided society. Although it is important not to exaggerate what the isolation of a single issue can reveal about a broader peace process, an examination of the polcing issue can help reveal how contentious issues are approached by the main parties to the Northern Ireland conflict.

The Background to Policing in Northern Ireland [1]
Just as the State in Northern Ireland has been contested, so has its primary institutions including the police force. For many nationalists, the Royal Ulster Constabulary is the first, and certainly the most visible, line of defence of a State which they have difficulty accepting as legitimate. They also tend to regard it as an ‘ethnic police force;’ its overwhelmingly Protestant membership comes from Protestant centres of population and polices Catholic areas with which it has little affinity. Furthermore, the ‘Ulsterisation’ policy which the British government introduced from the mid-1970s gave the RUC a much greater security role.[2] As a result, the RUC became intimately linked in the republican consciousness with a series of incidents (‘shoot to kill’, the policing of paramilitary funerals, supergrass trails etc.) which reinforced the view that the police force was extremely partial and capable of repressive violence. Unionists, on the other hand, have a high degree of attachment to the RUC. Most RUC members come from the unionist tradition, and the force’s main mission, upholding the security of Northern Ireland, matches unionism’s principal political goal. As the RUC became a major victim of republican violence in pursuit of this goal, unionist identification with the police force has strengthened.[3] The RUC, through its membership and through its symbolism, also reflected core unionist values of the preservation of the existing order, respect for monarchy and the British system of government.

Any debate on the nature of policing in a post-conflict Northern Ireland is likely to face a number of important questions. One such question concerns the primary purpose of the police force. In a liberal democratic state, the primary purpose of the police is as an aid to the criminal justice system within the law. Northern Ireland’s security situation has meant that the prevention of internal subversion has tended to overshadow this role. In a sense, the RUC has adopted the characteristics of a ‘paramilitary’[4] force, (in the strictest sense of that word); it is heavily armed, is reinforced by permanent emergency legislation and can take direct orders from the Secretary of State. Furthermore, for every two members of the RUC in Northern Ireland, there are three members of the armed forces.[5] The paramilitary campaigns have meant that many RUC personnel have a range of skills wholly unsuited to ‘normal’ policing duties, particularly since these are to be carried out among politically and culturally sensitive communities. Evidence of the strong orientation towards an anti-political violence stance to the detriment of other policing duties can be found in the British Home Office’s Inspectorate of Constabulary Report for 1993 which criticised the RUC for not having “an integrated crime strategy.”[6] The necessity of ensuring the physical security of police personnel, (through the use of armoured vehicles or the construction of hugely fortified police barracks) has also meant that the police force has been physically removed from many people in Northern Ireland, thus preventing the development of accessible and responsive policing. Another issue which would be likely to attract attention in any debate on the future of policing is the structure and organisation of the RUC. At a macro level, the RUC is formally governed according to a tripartite arrangement between the Secretary of State, the Police Authority for Northern Ireland (PANI)[7] and the RUC. In practice, however, the RUC has come under severe criticism for a lack of operational independence from political decision-makers and a disregard for public accountability through the Police Authority.[8] At a micro-level, the RUC is extremely large and top-heavy. The police to population ratio (if police overtime is taken into account) stands at 1:100,[9] up to five times the average in other UK police forces, with the annual policing budget costing in excess of £600m.[10] With three regional headquarters and thirty-eight sub-divisions, the RUC is also, in comparison with other police forces in the United Kingdom, over-bureaucratised.[11] A peaceful Northern Ireland would present significant opportunities for savings in the police budget, but because of the religious composition of the force, cuts in RUC numbers would fall proportionately more heavily on the Protestant community. Furthermore, it is difficult to envisage how enough Catholics could be admitted into RUC ranks to make a significant impact on the force’s religious composition if the size of the force was being reduced.[12]

Perhaps the most sensitive issue to be addressed in a debate about a post-conflict police force for Northern Ireland would be its acceptability to both communities. While the RUC is generally regarded as acceptable by the unionist community,[13] radical changes in the composition, role and ethos of the force may alter this acceptability. This would particularly be the case if unionists felt that the RUC was being changed solely to accommodate nationalists.[14]The RUC’s most fundamental acceptability problem, however, lies in its relations with the nationalist community. In 1994, less than 8% of RUC officers came from the Catholic community. While IRA targeting of police officers constituted an obvious deterrent to Catholic recruitment, many Catholics had difficulty identifying with the ethos and symbolism of the RUC. One former member of the Police Authority gave this damning assessment:

RUC ‘canteen culture’ is stubbornly male, Protestant, British, unionist and laddish...
Orange and Masonic membership is widespread; only one in 14 officers is from the Catholic faith; officers are required to swear an oath of office pledging to ‘well and truly serve our sovereign lady, the Queen,’ and symbols of Britishness - royal portraits, union flags and so on - abound, to the exclusion of the minority tradition...
There is thus compelling evidence that, by failing to create a neutral working environment, the RUC has actually breached fair employment legislation.[15]

Any genuine reform of the RUC would have to include an effective strategy to tackle the force’s religious imbalance, and include measures to make it easier for Catholics to identify with it. It would also have to involve a re-assessment of police complaints procedures which suggest a high degree of indemnity for police officers against official censure.[16]

The Impact of the Ceasefires on Policing
The period of the paramilitary ceasefires did result in a number of changes in policing. For example, some RUC patrols in nationalist areas which were usually accompanied by military escorts, now patrolled alone. RUC officers began patrolling without flak jackets and the Police Authority invested in a number of cars painted in ‘police’ livery to complement the fleet of ubiquitous grey landrovers. With the sharp decline in paramilitary violence, the RUC was able to devote more attention to other duties, particularly to drug-related crime which was becoming increasingly visible in Northern Ireland for the first time.[17] A less urgent security situation also meant that RUC overtime was cut back by 50% with a saving of £20m.[18] Significantly, the number of Catholics applying to join the RUC increased from 12.2% to 21.5%,[19] signalling that a peace-time RUC would be much more acceptable to the Catholic community.[20] One important role which the RUC Chief Constable assumed after the declaration of the paramilitary ceasefires, was that of interpreting the status or permanence of those ceasefires and then advising the Secretary of State of appropriate security responses. Decisions to re-open roads between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland or the removal of watchtowers or permanent checkpoints were only made after consultations with the Chief Constable and the Army General Officer Commanding. More generally, the Chief Constable, with access to an intelligence network, adopted the role of a modern day soothsayer who could interpret paramilitary intentions.[21]

Political Reactions
The basic positions of Northern Ireland’s political parties, in relation to the policing issue, did not shift during the period of the paramilitary ceasefires. Issues of symbolism, for example the oath of allegiance or the RUC badge, attracted as much attention as substantive issues. The basic Sinn Féin position remained a demand that the RUC be disbanded, arguing that the force was unacceptable to nationalists and that any new policing service must start from a ‘clean slate.’[22] Constitutional nationalists argued that the RUC would have to undergo fundamental reforms, with one proposal suggesting the need for several police forces within Northern Ireland which would reflect the religious balance of a particular area.[23] Many unionists simply did not see policing as an issue and were satisfied with existing police structures.[24] Furthermore, they remained suspicious of the permanence of the paramilitary ceasefires, and were anxious that RUC force levels and powers were not reduced until guarantees about the end of paramilitary violence could be given. Essentially, however, many unionists interpreted proposals to change the RUC as part of a general trend of the diminution of the Union. According to DUP Party Secretary Nigel Dodds, “Enough concessions have already been given to the IRA and their fellow travellers with nothing in return and such a move [changes to the RUC name and oath] would be regarded as a betrayal of all those RUC officers who have died or been seriously injured over 25 years of troubles.”[25]

British Government Reactions
The notion that Northern Ireland’s policing structures were in need of reform in the context of changes in the political and security environment was acknowledged by the British government, PANI and by the RUC. All three bodies launched initiatives aimed at assessing the changes required. Taken individually, the proposed changes are modest. Taken together, as government ministers encouraged commentators to do,[26] they are also modest. The government approach to the policing issue (and to associated issues such as police complaints procedures and the use of plastic bullets) helps reveal wider British government strategy towards the Northern Ireland peace process. While Sinn Féin, and to a certain extent other members of the loose nationalist coalition, tried to construct an open-ended, fluid political process, the British government was anxious that the remit and time-table of the process be rigidly controlled. In the main, the government has approached contentious issues cautiously, through established procedural and legislative routes. The effect of dealing with contentious issues through review bodies and committees of experts has been to give the peace process an institutionalised character in which issues are dealt with slowly, in a compartmentalised fashion, and with a minimal risk of radicalism. Procedural mechanisms also have the effect of moving the focus of the discontent away from central government and nearer the disputants. British government attempts to make the peace process, (and by extension, reviews of policing and other issues) as unexceptional as possible are reinforced by two trends. The first is that recourse to review bodies and committees of experts has been extremely common throughout the Northern Ireland public sector in the form of non-elected and usually unqualified boards or ‘QUANGO’s’. The second is that a management consultancy culture has become endemic in government departments since the mid-1980s; in effect institutionalising review processes. The Irish government has remained largely silent on the policing issue, in public at least, as it has on most policy issues connected with the peace process. Presumably, it has pursued the issue through the less visible channel of the Maryfield Secretariat.

The government instituted a review of policing nine months after the declaration of the IRA ceasefire.[27] The review was to be carried out internally by representatives from the Northern Ireland Office, the RUC and PANI and was meant to contribute to a White Paper being prepared on the future of policing in Northern Ireland. It was given the working assumption that the paramilitary ceasefires would hold, but that Northern Ireland’s political leaders would be unable to reach a political settlement within eighteen months.[28] Shortly after the declaration of the paramilitary ceasefires, the Northern Ireland Secretary of State, Sir Patrick Mayhew, indicated that radical reforms of the RUC could be discounted. He told Parliament that, “...the police officers of the RUC face new challenges but also new anxieties, especially about their jobs. Those anxieties deserve our understanding and sympathy and a decent and worthy response from us. And they will get them. We shall not turn our backs on the people who have seen us through.”[29] In May 1995, the Police Authority embarked on its own consultation exercise, again with a view to contributing to the planned government White Paper on policing. It wrote to all of Northern Ireland’s 600,000 households inviting written submissions on the future of Northern Ireland’s police force. Less than 8,000 replies were received. The consultation exercise, or more specificially the interpretation of its results, inflamed tensions within the Police Authority between the majority of members who favoured a minimalist approach to reform of the RUC and the Authority’s chairman and another member who were in favour of more far-reaching reforms, particularly over the matter of the accountability of the RUC Chief Constable to the Authority, and by extension, the public.[30] After a number of public rows, the Authority gave a vote of no confidence in its Chairman, David Cook, who refused to resign.[31] The Secretary of State, who alone has power to make appointments to the Police Authority, was then faced with the decision to sack the Chairman or face down the majority of members who were opposed to significant reform. He chose the former course of action. The subsequent Police Authority consultation report (Everyone’s Police) made no recommendations on changes to the RUC’s name, uniform and badge, and on the issue of attracting more Catholic recruits, its only proposal was a replacement of the oath of allegiance to the British monarch.[32] Even so, the RUC’s representative association condemned the consultation exercise as “ill-judged” and criticised the way in which the force had been “poked over, dissected and prodded.”[33]

In May 1996, the government put forward details of its proposed White Paper. The Foundations for Policing proposals concentrated on clarifying the RUC’s tripartite governing structure (shared between the RUC, NIO and PANI). It also sought to “provide new mechanisms for greater community involvement in, and identification with policing.” Significantly, the White Paper did not deal with issues of symbolism or wider reform issues. Instead, it noted that any future legislation on policing “would...be informed by the forthcoming discussions on policing in the all-party political talks that are due to take place on an open agenda.”[34] The RUC has itself put forward its own plans for a modernisation (rather than re-organisation) of the force. A Fundamental Review of Policing, published in January 1997, makes few ‘fundamental’ recommendations. It notes that “major changes in staffing levels will be almost entirely security dependent” and is mainly confined to the introduction of new efficiency standards, information technology and training programmes.[35]

Parades
One by-product of the Northern Ireland peace process has been a renewed emphasis on street demonstrations and politico-religious marches. This has had direct consequences for the RUC. Most controversy has been attached to Orange Order parades. The Order is exclusively Protestant, and given the divided nature of Northern Ireland, it has a strong political dimension.[36] Approximately 2,700 parades are held each year by Orange and related institutions. The vast majority of these parades pass without incident. Many Catholics find the parades intimidatory and offensive, and object to having to leave their areas or stay indoors during the marches. Supporters of the Orange Order argue that the parades are traditional, mainly religious and have a right to use public highways. There are perhaps seven reasons why the parades issue has become more politically charged in the 1990s. First, shifts in population have meant that, in some places, parades which traditionally passed through Protestant areas, now pass through Catholic areas.[37] This has lead to calls for the re-routing of parades away from Catholic areas. Second, following the loyalist shooting of five Catholics in a bookmakers shop in the Lower Ormeau Road, Belfast in February 1992, Orange and Apprentice Boys parades past that site have become particularly sensitive to residents.[38] The Lower Ormeau Road parade has greater significance because it is one of the first major parades of the year and sets the tone for other parades. Third, there seems to have been a conscious politicisation of the parades issue among republicans and unionists. Many unionists believe that Sinn Féin took a deliberate decision to agitate on the parades issue and that nationalist resident’s groups are fronts for Sinn Féin - a claim which the party denies.[39] Furthermore, the Ulster Unionist Party has been particularly ready to take a stand on the parades issue. The prominent role which leading UUP member David Trimble played in the 1995 Orange Order-RUC stand-off at Drumcree is thought to have been a decisive factor in his subsequent election as party leader. No UUP MPs backed his election; instead his power base is located in grass-roots unionism, and to maintain it he is required to play a visible role in the parades issue.[40] A high profile on this issue also helps the UUP maintain it’s position of ‘defender of the Union’ at a time when unionists are faced with a wider electoral choice. Fourth, membership of the Orange Order has become significantly more hard-line over the past twenty years, with the “...withdrawal of many of the professional and middle classes.”[41] Fifth, the paramilitary ceasefires may have given many people in Northern Ireland confidence to engage in street politics - something which they may have been cautious about when the paramilitary campaigns were on-going.[42] Sixth, the parades issue was one of the few live issues during the peace process which gave nationalism and unionism the opportunity for direct, public confrontation. In a sense, the issue has had the capacity to become “the alternative troubles.”[43]

A seventh reason why the parades issue may have become more contentious during the 1990s relates to broader political change or perceived change. Crucially, many within both communities have come to regard the parades issue as an indicator of their treatment in any new political arrangement and the transitional phase which would usher it in. The nationalist readiness to protest may be related to a renewed confidence after the construction of a ‘nationalist coalition,’[44] and the recognition of the equal legitimacy of unionist and nationalist identities by the British and Irish governments in the 1993 Joint Declaration.[45] The unionist readiness to defend their right to march, on the other hand, may be linked to wider fears of an undermining of the Union. According to Jeffrey Donaldson, Assistant Grand Master of the Orange Order, “If nationalists cannot tolerate the culture and tradition of the Orange Order for 15 minutes in one year then I think we are entitled to ask what hope is there for the future?”[46] One unionist historian summed up the Orangemen’s argument thus:

For the past 25 years Protestants have felt themselves to be in a permanent retreat. They have experienced the loss of Stormont; the collapse of traditional and multinational firms which employed them; the most draconian fair employment legislation in western Europe which stops them being ‘spoken for’ when seeking work; the imposition of an international ‘diktat’ in 1985, when despite loyalist protest the Anglo-Irish Agreement gave the Republic a say in Northern Ireland’s affairs; John Major’s statement that Britain no longer had a strategic or economic interest in the region; and Tricolours and street signs in Irish no longer torn down by the RUC.
In the past week litter bins over much of Belfast have sprouted neatly lettered labels saying Bruscar (‘litter’ in Irish the language). To Protestants, it seems like a sign of the times. Celebrations Orange marches may be, but increasingly they re a collective and determined attempt to hold the line.[47]

Mediation between resident’s groups and the marching organisations has had little success in 1995 and 1996. The re-routing of Orange parades away from nationalist areas in 1995 led to a three day stand-off between police and Orangemen at Drumcree, near Portadown.[48] The issue inflamed sectarian tensions, with an increase in arson attacks on churches and other identifiably ‘Catholic’ and ‘Protestant’ property.[49] The 1995 pattern was repeated in 1996, though on a much greater scale. Police attempts to block the Orange parade at Drumcree prompted severe rioting and public unrest in Protestant areas across Northern Ireland. When the RUC, some days later, forced the parade along the mainly Catholic Garvaghy Road with considerable violence, rioting broke out in many nationalist areas. There followed, in the words of the Secretary of State, “massive...civil disorder...the worst set-back for many years.”[50] Briefly, the violence sparked off by the 1996 parades resulted in two deaths, a spate of arson attacks and intimidation, a deep polarisation in community relations and a severe blow to attempts to attract inward investment and tourism.[51] The policing bill for the marching season came to £13m, while damage in excess of this figure was caused.[52]

Police handling of the parades issue has resulted in severe criticism from both unionists and nationalists. This was particularly serious given that the reduction in paramilitary violence had allowed the RUC to build better relations with some members of the Catholic community. Not only was it left to the RUC to police the parades, (using Public Order legislation), the force was also given the essentially political task of deciding whether or not parades should go ahead. The extremely divisive nature of the parades issue means that any decision is likely to incur the wrath of one community or the other. RUC decisions to block or re-route Orange parades risk alienating the RUC from the traditionally supportive unionist community, while decisions to allow marches through Catholic areas re-affirm nationalist views that the RUC is pro-unionist and irreformable. At the height of the Drumcree stand-off in 1996, the Ulster Unionist Party’s Deputy Leader, John Taylor, noted that, “...the majority community is swinging very strongly against the RUC.”[53] In 1995, one Church of Ireland minister had warned that, “If the RUC continues to allow itself to be the tool of the NIO to face down the Protestant population and Orangemen in particular then all hell could break loose in Northern Ireland.”[54] On the other hand, nationalists have accused the RUC of showing more relish in dealing with nationalist demonstrators.[55] According to one leading member of a resident’s group, after protesters had been cleared off a road to allow an Orange parade to proceed, “There is no peace process. Nothing has changed for nationalists. The RUC has not changed. They laughed as they beat us. You could see by their faces they were really enjoying themselves.”[56] Six thousand plastic bullets were fired by police in a ten day period in July 1996, over 90% of them at Catholics.[57]

After the RUC handling of the Drumcree stand-off in 1996, the RUC Chief Constable admitted that the force had “lost ground with the nationalist community,” and that “the rule of law has had a set-back” but was adamant that the RUC was not to blame for sparking the violence.[58] Nationalist political leaders claimed that any improvement in relations between the RUC and the Catholic community which had taken place during the peace process had been swept away as a result of the RUC behaviour. Survey information supports this view. The number of Catholics in favour of reform of the RUC increased from 38% in 1995 to 46% in 1996, with the number calling for the replacement of the RUC increasing marginally to 32%. 75% of Catholics felt that the RUC had treated Protestant better during the Summer’s disturbances, with 65% believing that plastic bullets had been used more against Catholics than Protestants. Significantly, the proportion of Protestants in favour of reform of the RUC increased from 23% in 1995 to 32% in 1996.[59] The Chief Constable claimed that the parades issue had placed his force in an invidious position and that it was unfair to expect the police to both adjudicate on contentious parades and then enforce the decision. The government response, the North Commission, fitted the government pattern of referring contentious decisions to committees of experts.

Conclusions
It is important to be cautious when isolating specific issues associated with the Northern Ireland peace process and then attempting to reach broader conclusions about the process. What does seem to be clear is that there is no pre-ordained hierachy of issues to be dealt with as part of the peace process. Clearly the lack of agreement on the existence and desireability of a peace process contributes to this lack of an issue hierarchy. So too does the failure to the resolve the decommissioning issue which the British government and many unionists have regarded as an absolute pre-condition to progress on other issues. The Irish government, the SDLP and a number of the smaller parties have prioritised the agreement of a comprehensive agenda in the multi-party talks, which would presumably include policing. In the absence of structured talks, an agreed agenda, and political will, it is difficult to envisage how sustained policy debates can be held. The policing issue was raised only sporadically, and usually through the unstructured fora of the media. It was another issue (parades), however, which attracted greatest attention to the policing issue. One of the most significant consquences of the policing of parades in 1996 was a growing public perception of the necessity for police reforms. Albeit, Protestant and Catholic views on policng changed because of perceived bias against their own communities. At the same time, changing perceptions of the RUC, particularly within the Catholic community, have shown that opinions on contentious issues are not necessarily set in stone. One of the most interesting questions is why has the fluidity of opinion not been reflected by the political parties which have not altered their positions on policing.

While nationalists repeatedly accused the British government of ‘foot-dragging’ throughout the peace process, it is worth noting that the government, the PANI and the RUC did take a number of initiatives on the policing issue since August 1994. While a number of these initiatives may have occured in the course of normal organisational reviews, a number were introduced as a direct consequence of the changing political environment. At the same time, the procedural and determinedly unexceptional nature of the government initiatives reflected the government’s discomfort with the concept of a fluid, open-ended peace process with no fixed outcome.[60] The government approach to policing reforms, via committes, review bodies and existing legislative routes, has been replicated in other policy areas.[61] An insight into the RUC’s own view on the need for far-reaching reform came from its out-going Chief Constable, Sir Hugh Annesley; “I do not start from a point of view that there is something wrong with the RUC and it needs to be changed.”[62] Certainly, continuing paramilitary violence is likely to place the emphasis on the necessity of security rather than the desirability of reform. The key to substantive changes in policing structures, however, lies in the ability of Northern Ireland’s political parties to reach agreement on effective political structures. Should widespread agreement on the future of Northern Ireland be reached, then a police force designed to protect that future would be likely to enjoy popular support. In reality, Northern Ireland is likely to have a contested future for some time to come, and so its police force is likely to be contested.

Footnotes:

[1] See Andrew Hamilton., “Policing Northern Ireland: Current Issues,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 18, (1995), pp 233-242; A Hamilton & Linda Moore., “Policing a Divided Society,” in Facets of the Conflict in Northern Ireland, Seamus Dunn (ed), Macmillan, London, 1995, pp 187-198; Chris Ryder provides an institutional hagiography in The RUC: A Force Under Fire, Methuen, London, 1989.
[2] Ulsterisation is explained in Michael Brake & Chris Hale., Public Order and Private Lives: The politics of law and order, Routledge, London, 192, pp 62-5; Brendan O’Leary & John McGarry., The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland, The Athlone Press, London, 1993, pp 202-9.
[3] According to RUC figures, 297 police officers were killed and 7,374 were injured as a result of political violence between 1969 and March 1995; Britain in the USA Website, “The Royal Ulster Constabulary“ http://britain.nyc.ny.us/bistext/nireland/rucbrief.htm [Link currently not available] Ryder., ibid, catalogues RUC casualties.
[4] Defined as “denoting or relating to a group of personnel with military structure functioning either as a civil force or in support of military force.” Collins English Dictionary, (Third Edition Updated), HarperCollins, Glasgow, 1994, p 1131.
[5] Sir Patrick Mayhew., Hansard, Vol. 248, (27 October 1994), Col 1023.
[6] Ed Maloney., “Criticism for RUC in British report,” The Sunday Tribune, (1 May 1994).
[7] An outline of the aims and functions of PANI is contained in Everyone’s Police; A Partnership for Change, A Report on a Community Consultation undertaken by the Police Authority for Northern Ireland in 1995, Chapter 2, Section 2. See also, Three years of Progress, 1985-1988: Working Together to Police Northern Ireland: the work of the Police Authority for Northern Ireland and the Royal Ulster Constabulary, PANI, 1988.
[8] See Dick Grogan., “Arguments rage over shape of peace-time force,” The Irish Times, (17 May 1995) and “RUC head rejects criticism of report by Police Authority,” The Irish Times, (25 May 1995). See also The Committee on the Administration of Justice, Police Accountability in Northern Ireland, CAJ Pamphlet, No. 11, (September 1988).
[9] Ed Maloney., ibid.
[10] “New RUC management structures proposed,” The Irish Times, (2 May 1996).
[11] See Tony Worthington (a Labour Frontbench spokesperson on Northern Ireland) “Why the RUC must be set in the right framework,” The Belfast Telegraph, (3 April 1996).
[12] The 13,000 strong RUC had an in-take of less than 200 recruits per annum in 1994 and 1995. In all, only 40 Catholics joined the RUC in this period. “40 Catholics joined the RUC in two years,” The Belfast Telegraph, (30 March 1996).
[13] A community attitudes survey conducted during the period of the paramilitary ceasefires found that 80% of Protestants and 69% of Catholics found that the RUC was doing a good job; “Over 75% believe the RUC is doing a good job,” The Irish Times, (26 June 1995); A Hamilton (1995) ibid, notes a deterioration in RUC relations with working class Protestants, particularly after the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, p 236. See also, Ryder., ibid, pp 324-333.
[14] See, for example, “Police deny ‘Protestant dismissals’”, The Belfast Telegraph, (18 January 1996).
[15] Chris Ryder., “On course to meet the RUC double challenge,” The Irish Times, (3 September 1996).
[16] “Supervisory body criticises RUC complaints procedures,” The Irish Times, (3 May 1996).
[17] “RUC drugs squad set to expand,” The Irish Times, (19 September 1995). A consultation exercise by PANI in 1995 revealed that 95% of respondents wanted to see an increase in anti-drug policing, Everyone’s Police, ibid.
[18] “Peace saves RUC millions in overtime,” The Irish Times, (15 December 1995).
[19] “Annesley optimistic that peace will hold,” The Irish Times, (25 May 1995).
[20] “Minister claims RUC attracting Catholics,” The Irish Times, (8 December 1995).
[21] See for example, “Annesley optimistic that peace will hold,” ibid; “Flanagan again warns of IRA attacks,” (5 October 1996) 7 “RUC rejects suggestions of IRA phoney war,” (3 January 1997) all from The Irish Times; “Annesley predicts new IRA ceasefire, new bombings,” The Belfast Telegraph, (21 October 1996); and “Speech delivered by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Sir Patrick Mayhew, at the North and West Institute for Further and Higher Education, Londonderry, November 1995.”
[22] See Alex Maskey., “Case for disbandment has been well made,” The Belfast Telegraph, (8 May 1996) and “Unarmed police for North urged,” The Irish Times, (27 February 1995).
[23] Suggestion made by SDLP MP Seamus Mallon.
[24] A Belfast Telegraph poll found that less than half the people in Northern Ireland believed that the RUC should be reformed as part of the peace process, “Police reform divides Ulster,” (18 January 1996).
[25] Statement by Alderman Nigel Dodds., “RUC Reform,” on DUP Website, (http://www.dup.org.uk/ruc.htm) [Link currently not available], 1996; see also Ken Maginnis., “Problem lies with society, not the embattled RUC,” The Belfast Telegraph, (8 May 1996).
[26] See “note to editors” in “Policing Proposals Announced by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 2 May 1996,” on Britain in the USA Website, (http://britain.nyc.ny.us/bistext/nireland/police.htm) [Link currently not available]
[27] “Minister says RUC needs reform,” The Belfast Telegraph, (6 June 1995).
[28] “Ceasefires prompt major RUC review,” The Independent, (23 May 1995).
[29] Hansard, Vol. 248, (October 1994), Col 1023.
[30] According to Andrew Hamilton., “It is clear that the chief constable is not accountable to PANI in its role of representing the community in any meaningful sense.” Ibid, p 236.
[31] See “Police body official rejects charge,” The Belfast Telegraph, (21 September 1995); “Police authority consultation report to be published by the end of the moth,” (14 March 1996); Suzanne Breen., “Police Authority struggles to adapt to changing times,” (19 March 1996); “Sacked police authority man says buck is being passed,” The Irish Times, (10 May 1996).
[32] “Report on RUC window-dressing, say nationalists,” The Irish Times, (27 May 1996).
[33] “Leader of RUC body wants sweeping new measures if violence returns,” The Irish Times, (5 June 1996).
[34] Britain in the USA Website, ibid.
[35] “RUC faces up to change,” The Belfast Telegraph, (16 January 1996).
[36] O’Leary & McGarry refer to the Orange Order, in a historical sense, as “often rabidly sectarian,” ibid, p 80; Brian Walker notes that all of Northern Ireland’s Prime Ministers and most Unionist MPs, in the Stormont era, were members of the Orange Order. He also notes that the Order has provided a leadership for unionism, Dancing to History’s Tune: History, myth and politics in Ireland, The Institute of Irish Studies, The Queen’s University of Belfast, 1996, pp 50 & 91-99. See also, Feargal Cochrane., “‘Meddling at the Crossroads’: The Decline and Fall of Terence O’Neill within the Unionist community,” Unionism in Modern Ireland, R English & G Walker (eds), Macmillan, London, 1996, pp 148-168; Sarah Nelson., Ulster’s Uncertain Defenders: Loyalists and the Northern Ireland Conflict, Appletree Press, Belfast, 1984, pp 33-4 & 42-3; John Whyte., Interpreting Northern Ireland, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, pp 30-2.
[37] The degree of residential segregation between Catholics and Protestants has doubled over the past twenty years. About 50% of Northern Ireland’s population live in areas which are more than 90% Catholic or Protestant. See David McKittrick., “Apartheid deepens on streets of Ulster,” The Independent on Sunday, (21 March 1993).
[38] Eamonn Mallie & David McKittrick., The Fight for Peace: The Secret Story Behind the Irish Peace Process, Heinemann, London, pp 130 & 308.
[39] Author interviews with senior members of Sinn Féin and the Ulster Democratic Party.
[40] Drumcree is in David Trimble’s constituency.
[41] Brian Walker., ibid, p 98; See also Frank Doherty., “The new face of the Orange Order,” The Sunday Business Post, (9 July 1995).
[42] Author interview with Malachi O’Doherty.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Author interview with a senior Sinn Féin figure.
[45] Joint Declaration between Irish Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds and British Prime Minister, John Major, 15 December 1993. [46] “We are determined,” The Irish Times, (4 July 1996). Similar sentiments are expressed in Jones, ibid, p 70.
[47] Jonathan Bardon., “Loyal tributes to a culture under siege,” The Irish Times, (27 April 1996).
[48] Dominic Bryan., (et al) Political Rituals: Loyalist Parades in Portadown, Centre for the Study of Conflict, University of Ulster, 1995 gives a detailed account of the parades issue in one area, as well as an overview of the Orange Order. See also, David R Jones (et al)., The Orange Citadel: A history of Orangeism in Portadown District, Portadown Cultural Heritage Committee, Portadown, 1996.
[49] See, for example, “Church leaders condemn sectarian attacks,” (24 July 1995); “RUC has video lead in search for attackers,” (21 July 1995); “Tensions heighten in North after weekend of arson attacks and beatings,” (17 July 1995); “Concern at number of arson attacks in North,” (23 August 1995) all from The Irish Times.
[50] “Statement by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Sir Patrick Mayhew, in the House of Commons on Monday, 15 July 1996,” on Britain in the USA Website, “Recent events in Northern Ireland,” (http://148.100.56.24/bis/nireland/ps150796.htm) [Link currently not available]
[51] The Executive Summary of the Independent Review of Parades and Marches, (North Report), HMSO, 1996 contains an overview of the main event of 1996, paragraphs 23-32. See also Bill Tosh, Chairman of the Confederation of British Industry, Northern Ireland, “Marching proudly towards another economic disaster,” The Irish News, (28 January 1997).
[52] See “Marching season costs North £13m,” The Irish Times, (13 September 1996) and “N Ireland: Ulster budget to be reduced,” The Financial Times, (11 December 1996).
[53] “RUC officers and families have been threatened,” The Irish Times, (10 July 1996).
[54] “Remarks about cardinal ‘extremely regrettable,’” The Irish Times, (23 August 1995).
[55] See, for example, “RUC ‘curfew’ prevents nationalist protest,” (13 July 1995); “7,000 at Portadown rally hear calls for end of RUC,” (22 July 1996); both from The Irish Times.
[56] “RUC holds inquiry after protester hit by plastic bullet,” The Irish Times, (14 August 1995).
[57] “6,000 plastic bullets fired since Drumcree stand-off,” The Irish Times, (16 July 1996). For a series of eyewitness reports of RUC behaviour from a nationalist perspective in Derry see In the Line of Fire, Pat Finucane Website, (http://www.serve.com/pfc/july96/whole.html).
[58] See full text of “Chief Constable Sir Hugh Annesley interviewed by Barry Cowan on BBC Radio 7 days programme on Sunday 14 July 1996,” on RUC Website, (http:www.nics.gov.uk/press/ruc/bcowan.htm). See also “Drumcree setback for rule of law in short term, says Annesley,” The Irish Times, (15 July 1996).
[59] All figures from A Partnership for Change: A Report on Further Consultation by the Police Authority for Northern Ireland, see annexe 1. This survey was held in September 1996, after the Drumcree disturbances.
[60] Sir Patrick Mayhew was uncomfortable with the term ‘peace process,’ instead preferring to use ‘political process’ or later ‘talks process.’
[61] Most notably through the North committee on the parades issue.
[62] “Annesley’s final report unyielding in face of demands for reform of the RUC,” The Irish Times, (22 June 1996).

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